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Abstract. A fr.ludsler can be an impersonator or a swindler. An impersonator is an illegitimate user
who steals resources from the victims by "laking over" their accounts. A swindler is a Icgilimllle user
who intentionally harms the system or olber users by deception. Previous rescart:h efforts in fraud
detection concenrrnle on identifYing frauds caused by impersonators. Detecting fmuds conducted by
swindlers is a challenging issue. In this paper, three types of deceiving iDleDlions, namely uncovered
deceiving intention, trapping intention, and illusive inlenLion, are defined. We propose an architecture
that integrates deceiving intention prediction with frnud detection to catch swindlers. It consists of four
components: profile-based anomaly detector, state tmnsition llDalysis, deceiving intention prediclor, and
decision-making component. Profile-based anomaly detector outputs fmud confidence indicating the
possibility of freud when there is a sharp deviation from usual pallems. Slate transition analysis
provides SUlle description to users when an activity results in entering a danger stote leading to fraud.
Deceiving intention predictor discovers malicious intentions. DI-eonfidenee is used to characterize the
belief that a target entity has such intentions. An algorithm is developed to cvoluate DI-confidence by
analyzing an entity's behaviors. Its effectiveness is investigated via experimenr.al study. A user·
conIigurable risk evaluation function is designed for decision-making eomponenl. The decision.making
component raises a mud alarm when expected risk is greater than fraud-investigating cos\.
I.Introduction
Fraudsters can be classified into two categories: impersonators and swindlers. An impersonator is an
illegitimate user who steals resources from the victims by "taking over" their accounts. Taking
superimposed fraud in telecommunication [9] as an example, impersonators gain access to the accounts of
legitimate users by stealing their Mobile Identification Numbers (MIN) and Equipment Serial Numbers
(ESN) and producing cloned phones. The abnonnal usage is imposed on the victims. All subsequent bills
will go to their accounts. A swindler, on the other hand, is a legitimate user who intentionally harms the
system or other users by deception. For instance, subscription fraud conducted by swindlers is recognized
as one of the major frauds in telecommunication today. The fraudsters obtain legitimate accounts and use
the services without intention to pay the bills.
Impersonators can be forestalled by utilizing cryptograph technologies that provide strong protection to
users' authentication infonnation. The idea of separation of duty may be applied to reduce the impact of a
swindler. The essence of separation of duty is to restrict the power an entity (e.g., a transaction partner) can
have to prevenl him from abusing it. An empirical example of this idea is thallaws are set, enforced and
interpreted by different parties. Separation of duty can be implemented by using access control mechanisms
such as role based access control mechanism, lattice-based access control model (13). Duties are separated
statically or dynamically. Suppose a set of operations {aI, 02, ...On} need to be executed in order to
complete a transaction. Static separation of duty assigns the execution privileges to entities in such a way
that nobody is allowed to execute all operations. Dynamic separation of duty imposes no constraint on
execution privileges. An entity is allowed to carry out any potential operation. However, the possibility of
executing some (conflict) operations is automatically ruled out when an operation is perfonned. The
• This research is supported by NSF grantllS-0209059
Chinese wall policy arising in lhe commercial sector of consulting services is an example of dynamic
separation of duty.
Separation of duty policy and other mechanisms like dual-log bookkeeping prevent frauds but cannot
eliminate them. For example, for online auctions, such as eBay, sellers or buyers have restricted knowledge
about the other side. Although eBay, as a trusted third party, hns authentication services to check the
information of sellers and buyers (e.g. phone number, credit card number etc), it is impossible to verify all
of them due to the high quantities of online transactions. Fraud is a persistent issue under such an
environment.
In this paper, we concentrate on swindler detection. Three approaches are considered: (1) detecting an
entity's activities that deviate from nonnal patterns; (2) Constructing state transition graphs for existing
fraud scenarios and detecting frauds similar to the known ones (3) discovering an entity's intention based
on his past behaviours. The ftrst two approaches are also used to detect frauds conducted by impersonators.
The last one is only applicable for swindler detection. An architecture utilizing all three approaches is
proposed.
The rest of lhis paper is organized as the follows. Section 2 introduces lhe related work. Formal
definitions related to fraud and deceiving intentions are presented in section 3. An architecture for swindler
detection is proposed in section 4. It consists of four components: profile-based anomaly detector, state
transition analysis, deceiving intention predictor, and decision-making. The functionalities and design
considerations for each component are discussed. The algorithm for deceiving intention prediction and
experiments testing it are presented. The conclusion and future work is in section 5.
2.Related work
Fraud detection systems are widely used in telecommunication, online transactions, computer and
network security, and insurance. The majority of research efforts addresses superimposed fraud detection in
telecommunications [2][3][10][11]. When a phone call is made, a toll ticket is generated to record
information, such as the time, duration and destination, from the call. Data mining [4][5][7], machine
learning [1][2] and statistical methods [3][1l] have been developed to detect fraud on recorded data.
Effective fraud detection uses both fraud rules and pattern analysis.
Fawcett and Provost [4] presented an adaptive rule-based detection framework for superimposition
fraud. First, fraud patterns are encoded in the form of classification rules. Each account is profiled during
non-fraud periods to determine normal user behavior patterns. After the profiling step, online monitors
check each transaction against established pntterns to indicate anomalies. The system combines the outputs
of monitors to decide ifit will raise an alarm.
Burge and Shawe-Taylor [3] developed a neural network technique for fraud detection. The probability
distributions of current behavior profiles and behavior profile histories are compared using Hellinger
distances. Larger distances mean more suspicion of fraud.
Rosset et al. [9] pointed out that standard classification and rule generation is not appropriate for fraud
detection. In rule-based fraud detection, the generation and selection rule set should combine both user-
level and behavior-level attributes. The rule set should have high coverage of fraud cases, be accurate, have
quick triggering, and the set size should be small.
Chan et a!. [8] proposed two approaches solving incompatible schema problem caused by distributed
database sharing during fraud detection.
Due to the skewed distribution of fraud, one challenge in fraud detection is a very high false olann rate.
Several criteria exist to evaluate the performance of fraud detection engines. ROC [1][II](12]is a common
one. Rosset et al. [9] uses accuracy and fraud coverage as criteria. Accuracy is the number of detected
instances of fraud over the total number of classified frauds. Fraud coverage is the number of detected
frauds over the total number of frauds. It is difficult to know exactly the total number of frauds. Stolfo et al.
[6] use a cost-based metric in commercial fraud detection systems. They proposed that if a fraud causes
loss less than lhe cost for the investigation, then this fraud should be ignored. However, if such fraud
happens frequently enough, the accumulated loss will be significant, and the cost-based model can't detect
it.
Our work focuses on detecting fraud from swindlers. In the rest of the paper, fraud refers to the cheating
actions from swindlers.
3. Formal definitions
Fraud occurs when two or more enl1l1es cooperate to fulfil a task. When a user subscribes the
telecommunication services from a specific company, the user and the company establish a cooperative
relationship. A transaction between buyer and seller on eBay is another example of cooperation. Each
entity commits to his partner to satisfy certain terms, conditions, integrity constraints and assumptions. A
swindler is an entity that has no intention to keep one's commitment.
• Commitment: The integrity constraints, assumptions and conditions an entity promises to slltisfy in
cooperation. Commitment is described by using a set conjunction of expressions. An expression could
be (a) an equality between a variable and constant, or (b) a user-defined predicate. For the first case,
the variable in an equality represents a feature used in the commitment while the constant representing
the expected values of the feature. For the second case, a user-defined predicate represents certain
complex constraints, assumptions and conditions. An associated user-defined boolean function checks
whether the constraints etc. hold.
Example: A commitment of a seller for selling a vase is
(Received_by = 04/01) t\ (prize = $1 000) t\ (Quality = A) t\ RetumIfAnyQualityProblem
This commitment says that the seller promises to send out one "A" quality vase at the price of$1000.
The vase should be received by Apr. 01. If there is quality problem, the buyer can return the vase.
• Outcome: The actual results aRer execution. For each expression in a commitment, there is an
expression in an outcome corresponding to it. For an equality expression, the constant indicates the
actual value of the feature. For a predicate expression in a commitment, if the use-define function is
evaluated to be true, the predicate itself is included in the outcome. Otherwise, the negation of the
predicator is included.
Example: An outcome corresponds to the above commitment can be
(Received_by = 04/05) t\ (prize = $1000) t\ (Quality = B) t\ ...,RetumIfAnyQualityProblem
This outcome shows that the vase was received at Apr. 05. However, the quality was B. The return
request is refused. In this case, we may conclude that the seller is a swindler.
Predicates and feature variables play different roles in detecting whether an entity is a swindler or not.
We define two propenies, namely intention-testifying and intention-dependent.
Predicator:
• Intention testifying predicate: A predicate P is intention-testifying if we can conclude a cooperation
partner is a swindler given the fact that...,P appears in an outcome.
• Intention dependent predicate: A predicate P is intention-dependent if it is possible that a cooperation
partner is a swindler given the fact that..,P appears in an outcome.
In the above example, RetumIfAnyQualityProblem can be an intention testifying or an intention
dependent predicate. The decision is up to the user.
Feature variable:
Suppose the expected value of a feature variable V is E in a commitment. Its actual value is A in an
outcome. The domain of the feature variable is totally ordered by a dominant relationship. If a dominate p,
a is more desirable than p.
• Intention testifyingfeature variable: The feature variable V is intention-testifying if we can conclude a
cooperation panner is a swindler given the fact that E dominate A.
• Intention dependentfeahtre variable: The feature variable V is intention.dependent if it is possible that
a cooperation partner is a swindler given the fact that that E dominate A.
In the above example, prize is an intention testifying feature variable. The dominant relationship is
defined by natuml "<". If the seller charges more money, we conclude that he is a swindler. Quality and
received_by can be defined as intention dependent feature variables considering the fact that a seller
himself may not have fuU control on them.
An intention testifying feature variable/predicate is intention dependent. The opposite direction is not
necessarily true: An intention dependent feature variable/predicate may not be intention testifying.
3.1 Deceiving intentions
The intenlion testifying is so strong that few such variables/predicates are available in real applications.
Usually, variables/predicates are specified as intention dependent. A conclusion that a partner is a swindler
cannot be drawn with certainty based on one intention dependenl variablefpredicate in one outcome. Two
approaches can be used to increase the confidence: (1) consider multiple variables/predicates in one
outcome; (2) consider one variable/predicate in multiple outcomes. The second approach is used in this
paper.
We assume that a user is given a satisfied rating ranging from 0 to I for the actual value ofan intention
dependent variable in an outcome. The higher the rating is, the more satisfied the user is. The value of 0
indicates totally unacceptable while the value of 1 indicates that actual value is not worse than the expected
value. For example, if the quality of received vase is B, the rating can be 0.5. If the quality is C, the rating
may drop to 0.2. For an intention dependent predicator, the rating is either 0 or 1. In this section, three types
ofdeceiving intentions are identified.
A satisfied rating is related to an entity's deceiving intention as well as some unpredictable factors. Il is
modelled by using random variables with nonnal distribution. The mean function fm (n) detennines the
mean value of the nonnal distribution at the nih rating.
• Uncovered deceiving inlenrion: For a swindler with uncovered deceiving intention, the satisfied ratings
associated with him are stably low. The ratings vary in a small range over time. We can think that all
ratings obey the same nonnal distribution. The mean function is defined as fm(n) = m, where m is a
constant. Figure 1 shows satisfied ratings with fm(t)=<l.8. The fluctuation of ratings results from the
unpredictable factors.
• Trapping inlention: The rating sequence can be divided into two phases: preparing and trapping. An
entity behaves well in the preparing phase to achieve a trustworthy image. Then, he conducts fraud.
The mean function can be defined as:
fm(nJ = {m ltiglt n::;n~ Wherenoisthetumingpoint.
mlo", o/henV/se
Figure 2 shows satisfied ratings for a swindler with trapping intention. For the first 50 interactions, fm
(0) is 0.8 and 0.2 afterwards.
• Illusive intention: For a smart swindler with illusive intention, instead of misbehaving continuously, he
attempts to cover the bad effects by intentionaHy doing something good after misbehaviours. He
repeats the process of preparing and trapping. Fm (t) is a periodic function. For simplicity, we assume
the period is N, the mean function is defined as:
{
m", (nmodN)<n,fm(n) = "g"
mlow otherwise
Figure 3 shows satisfied ratings with period of 20. In the first 15 interactions of each period, fm(t) is
0.8. For last 5 interactions, fm(t) drops to 0.2.
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Fig. 1. Uncovered deceiving intention Fig. 2. Trapping intenLion Fig. 3. Illusive intention
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The major functionality of swindler detection is to react to a suspicious cooperation Ihat may lead to a
fraud. The design oflhe architecture is based on Ihe following considerations:
• Deviation from the usual pattern of an entity may imply the existence of a fraud, e.g., a sharp increase
in sales income may result from accounting fraud.
• The similarity between an entity's current activity and a known fraud scenario indicates the same fraud
may occur again.
• Analysis of an entity's behaviours in a relatively long period may reveal his real intentions that are
covered by good activities.
Swindler detection consists of four components: profile-based anomaly detector, state transition
analysis, deceiving intention predictor, and decision-making.
Profile-based anomaly detector monitors suspicious actions based upon the established patterns of an
entity. It outputs fraud confidence indicating the possibility of a fraud. State transition analysis builds a
state transition graph that provides state description to users when an activity results in entering a danger
state that may lead to a fraud. Deceiving intention predictor discovers deceiving intention of the
cooperation partner based on his history and satisfied ratings. DI·confidence is used to measure a deceiving
intention, which characterizes the belief that the target entity has such an intention. It is a real number
ranging over [O,l]. The higher the value is, the greater the belief is.
Anomaly detector, state transition analysis, and deceiving intention predictor work together to detect a
potential swindler. The former two analyze the enlity's activity in current cooperation while the last one
investigates his past behaviours. They provide fraud confidence, states, and Dl-confidence as inputs to the
decision-making component, which assists users to reach decisions based on predefined policies.
Fig. 4. Architecture for swindler deleclion
4.1 Profile-based anomaly detedor
Profile-based anomaly detector monitors for a target entity's activities that deviate from established
patterns. As illustrated in figure 5, the detector consists of three major components: rule generation and
weighting, user profiling, and online detection.
Profile-based anomaly detector boundary
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Fig. 5. Profile-based anomaly detector
Fraud rule generation and weighting applies data mining techniques to existing massive amount of
activity records. From this information, fraud rules are generated and assigned weights according to their
frequency ofoccurrence. Both entity-level and behaviour-level attributes are used in mining fraud rules and
weighting. Normally, a large volume of rules will be generated.
The second compollent in the profile-based anomaly detector is user profiling. The profiling
infonnation characterizes entity-level information, such as age, location and financial status. It also
captures an entity's behaviour patterns, such as how often he/she buys or sells, price range and interested
products. There are two sets of profiling data, one for current profiles and the other for history profile. In
order to reflect an entity's current behaviour patterns, the current profile set will be dynamically updated
according to behaviours. As behaviour level data will grow larger, for efficiency reasons, decay is needed
to reduce the data volume. This part also involves rule selection for a specific entity, based on profiling
results and rules. When combined with profiling information, a set of rules as fraud indicators for
monitoring a specific entity is selected. The rule selection also triggers the measurements of nonnal
behaviors with respect to the rules. These statistics are stored in history profiles for later quick online
detection reference.
The third component is online detection. When an activity occurs, the detection engine will retrieve the
related rules from the profiling component. It may also need to retrieve the entity's current behavior
patterns and behavior pattern history. Each rule will be checked and output a weight. For example, there are
rules to check how abnormal current behavior is comparing to the behavior pattern history. If the deviation
reaches the defined threshold, it will be caught. A weight will be output according to the rules. These
results are combined to determine fraud confidence.
4.2 State transition analysis
State transition analysis models fraud scenarios as series of states changing from an initial secure slate to
a final compromised state. The initial slate is the stan state prior to actions that lead to a fraud. The final
stale is the resulting state of completing the fraud. There may be several inlennediale states between them.
The action, which causes one state to transit to another, is called the signature action. Signature actions are
the minimum actions required to lead the state transition nearer the final slate. Without such action, this
fraud scenario will not be completed.
This model requires collecting fraud scenarios at the beginning and identifies the initial stales and the
final states. Then the signature actions for that scenario are identified in backward direction. The fraud
scenario is represented as a slate transition graph by the states and signature actions.
A danger factor is associated with each state. It is defined as the distance from the current state to the
fmal state that indicates a fraud. If one state leads to several final slates, the minimum distance is used. For
each activity, state transition analysis checks the potential next states. If the maximum value of the danger
factors associated with the potential states exceeds a threshold. a warning is raised and detailed state
description is sent to decision-milking component.
The state transition analysis model is a high-level abstraction in that it does not directly depend on data
records. This analysis also has the advantage of foreseeing the impending stales and enabling preventive
actions before reaching the compromise state.
4.3 Deceiving intention predictor
The kernel ofdeceiving intention predictor is the deceiving intention prediction (DIP) algorithm that views
the belief of deceiving intention as the complementary of trust belief. The trust belief about an entity is
evaluated based on the satisfied sequence <RI• R2•.•• , R,,>. R" is the most recent one, which contributes to
Cl portion of the trust belief. The rest (1 - Cl) portion comes from the previous trust belief that is detennined
recursively. For each entity, DIP maintains a pair of factors (i.e. cOIIS/nlctionfactor W. and destruction
factor Wd). If integrating current satisfied rating will increase lrust belief, Cl = W•. Otherwise, a. = Wd. W.
and Wd are initialized by the user. They satisfy the constraint W. < Wd so that the property of easy-
destruction-hard.oConstruction can be implemented. This property stems from the fact that more efforts are
needed to gain the same amount of trust than to loose it[14]. W. and Wd are modified when afoul e;vent
occurs. A foul event is triggered when a satisfied rating is lower than a threshold. Upon a foul event, the
target entity is put under supervision in the sense that his Wois decreased and Wd is increased. If the entity
does not conduct any foul event during the supervision period, his W0 and Wd are restored to the initial
values. Otherwise, his Woand Wdare further decreased and increased respectively. The supervision period
associated with an entity will increase each time when he is put under supervision, so that he will be
punished longer next time. In this way, an entity with worse history is trealed harsher. The DI-confidence is
computed as 1 - current trust belief.
DIP algorithm
P(k) is entity k's profile. It has six fields: lValue, We> Wd,period ('t'), rest, DI.oConfidence. tValue stores
current trusl belief. DI-confidence keeps current belief about entity k's deceiving intention
Input: Foul event threshold y. Initial construction factor W., destruction factor Wdsuch that W. <
Wd. Initial supervision period 'to PI is the penalty ratio used to decrease construction factor.
P2 and P3 are the penalty ratios used to increase destruction factor and supervision period
respectively. PI, P2E (0, 1) and Pl>1.
I: P(Ic}tValue = 0
2: P(l:).Wd = Wd
3: P(l:)'W.=Wo
4: P(l:).period = 't
5: P(l:).rest = 0
6: while there are new rating R
7: ifR:-::;. y then
8: PfI:),Wd = Pm.Wd+ PI)( (1- POO·Wd)
9: P(k).We P2x P(k).We
10: P(i<).rest = P(k).rest + P(l).period
II: P(k).period = P3 X P(k).period
12: end if





18: P(l).tValue = P(k).tValuex(I-W)+RxW







26: P(Ic).DI-Confidence = 1 - P(k).tValue
27: end while
The first to the fifth lines initialize an entity's profile. Line 7 detennines if a foul event occurs. If so, the
entity is put under supervision. His current construction factor is decreased and destruction factor is
increased (lines 8-9). Line 10 computes how long he will stay under supervision. Line 11 increments the
supervision period tbat will be used when he conducts a foul event next time. The thirteenth line updates
(Value. If the entity is under supervision and the new interaction is not a foul event, his rest supervision
period is reduced by one (lines 19-20). The construction factor and destruction factor are restored when the
supervision period ends (lines 21-24). DI-confidence is (l - tValue).
The increase of destruction factor Wd needs to Slllisfy the following constraints:
1. forarryn, w~ =:;:;1 andw: =:;:;w:+1
2. lim w~ =1
"~.
w: is the destruction factor when an entity is put under supervision n times without being released even
time. The first constraint ensures that w~ is monotonic increasing with n. The upper bound is I. The second
constraint indicates that the destruction factor can be close to I to any extent if n is large enough. The
function we use is represented as follows.
w:+ l =w:+Pl x(l-w:) (I)
By solving equation 1, we get:
W: =1-(1-wt)(l-Pl)n
where, wt is lhe initial destruction factor.
:.Equation I satisfies the above constraints.
Symmetrically, the decrease of construction factor w< must satisfy the following constraints:
I. foranyn,O::;w~ andw~+IS;W~
2. lim w~ =0
"~.
w~ is defined similarly as w: is. The function we use is as follows.
W~+l = P2 X w~ (2)
By solving equation 2, we get:
W~=P2XW~
where, w~ is the initial value of construction ratio.
:. Equation 2 satisfies the above constraints.




w, w, n, n, I n, y I
0.05 0.1 0.• 0.1 2 0.18 I
4.3.1 Experimental study
The purpose of the experiments is to investigate the effectiveness of DIP 10 discover the lhree
deceiving intentions defined in section 3.1. The parameters used in DIP are shown in table I. We and Wd
represent lhe initial construction and destruction factors respectively. PI. pz and Pl are penalty ratios for
construction factor, destru' f: t d . d . th thr h ld fi r a foul event.
Table 1. Pllrnmeter values
The results are shown in figure 6 - 8. The x-axis of each figure is the number of ratings. The y-axis
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Fig. 6. EJl:periment on swindler with uncovered deceiving intention
Swindler with uncovered deceiving intention: The result of applying DIP algorithm to a swindler with
uncovered deceiving intention is illustrated in figure 6. The mean function fm (n) are shown in figure 1.
Since the possibility for the swindler to conduct foul events is high, he is under supervision at most of the
time. The construction and destruction factors become close to 0 and 1 respectively because of the
punishment for foul events. The trust values are close to the minimum rating of interactions that is 0.1. The


















Fig. 7. Experiment on swindler with tfllpping intenlion
Swindler with trapping intention: The results of applying DIP algorithm to a swindler with trapping
intention are illustrated in figure 7. The mean function fm (n) are shown in figure 2. DIP algorithm responds
to the sharp drop offm(n) very quickly. After fm(n) changes from 0.8 to 0.2 it only lakes 6 ratings for 01-














Fig. II. Experiment on swindler with illusive intention
Swindler with illusive inlellf;ol/: The results of applying DIP algorilhm to a swindler with illusive
intention are illustrated in figure 8. The mean function fm (n) are shown in figure 3. When the mean
function fm(n) changes from 0.8 to 0.2, Dl-confidence increases. When fm(n) changes back from 0.2 to 0.8,
DI~onfidence decreases. DIP algorithm is able to catch this smart swindler in the sense that his DI-
confidence eventually increases to about 0.9. Figure 8 shows that the smart swindler's effort to cover a
fraud with good behaviours has less and less effect with the number of frauds.
4.4 Decision-making
Decision-making component takes fraud confidence, state description, and DI-confidence as inputs. It
passes warnings from state transition analysis to user and display the description of next potential state in a
readable format. The expected risk is computed as follows.
j(fr.J.ud confidence, DI-eonfidence, estimnled cost) = max (fraud confidence, DI-confidence) x estimated cost
Users can replace this function according to their specific requirements. A fuud alarm will arise when
expected risk is greater than frnud-investigating cost.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we classify frnudsters as impersonators and swindlers and present a mechanism to detect
swindlers. The concepts relevant to frauds conducted by swindlers are formally defined. Three deceiving
intentions are identified. The architecture for swindler detection consists of four components: profile-based
anomaly detector, state transition analysis, deceiving intention predictor, and decision-making component.
Profile-based anomaly detector monitors the sharp deviation from usual patterns. State transition analysis
constructs state transition graph for known frauds. An alarm is raised when current activity results in a
danger state possibly leading to a fraud. Deceiving intention predictor discovers malicious intentions based
on target entity's history. DIP algorithm is developed for deceiving intention prediction. Experimental
study shows that DIP effectively discovers three defined deceiving intentions.
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